

THE WAR DISCUSSED FROM THE GERMAN SIDE



In Egypt.




In India.

ENGLAND FINDS TROOPS.
In Australia.

In Polynesia.



In Canada.



But not in London.

Japan's Part and Her Intentions in the War

German Writer Reviews Treaty Made in 1902 Between England and Japan and Its Effect on Present Conflict.

The articles and other matter printed here comes from leading German periodicals and other sources friendly to the cause of Germany in the war. They are published in order to present to the readers of THE SUN the German side of the questions now in controversy between the leaders of thought of the hostile nations, thus giving them an opportunity to form impartial opinions of the issues. THE SUN assumes no responsibility for any of the statements made or opinions expressed.

In the Fifth Section of THE SUN to-day there are several pages of sketches and pictures showing scenes of the war from the German side in addition to pictures of the French and English armies in action.

By M. VON BRANDT OF WEIMAR.
From the Illustration of Leipzig

TO answer intelligently the question suggested by the entrance of Japan into the war we must look back to the year 1902.

Russia, showing complete disregard of existing treaties and of the protests of the interested nations, notably Japan, and with an aggression which had pushed her outposts on to Newchwang and across the Korean border, England, whose original plan had been to use China as a buffer against Russia, a plan which miscarried owing to the outcome of the Chinese-Japanese war, was looking for another ally that would be willing to undertake the war against Russia at its own risk and cost, and believed it had found such an ally in Japan.

On January 29, 1902, a treaty was signed between England and Japan in London. In view of their special interests, Great Britain's centering in China and Japan's being partly in China but principally in the two Powers who signed the treaty declared in the first article that it would be justified for either or both of them to take such measures as would be necessary to protect the lives and property of their subjects residing in China or Korea in case of aggression or trouble in either of these two countries. The second article contained a clause which stipulated that in case either of the two Powers was dragged into a war with a third Power in pursuance of the protective policy allowed by the first article to the other treaty signing Power and was to make every possible effort to prevent the other Power from taking part in the war. In case this was not possible the third article demanded that the other Power become the ally of its side. Power and carry on the war.

Through this treaty England was enabled in her own and England's interests to be successful in this war until her resources in men and money were exhausted and it appeared advisable for her to accept the intervention of the United States, which led finally to the Treaty of Portsmouth, September 5, 1905, when peace was concluded between Japan and Russia. The treaty was not satisfactory to the Japanese nation, particularly as Japan considered itself cheated out of its war indemnity. When the treaty was published she ceased only on September 6, a new treaty between England and Japan was published which ostensibly had been signed as far back as August 12 and which changed the existing treaty between these two Powers into an offensive as well as defensive treaty, thus delivering an unfortunate Korea, whose independence had been acknowledged in the first treaty, into the hands of its ancient enemy, Japan.

The purpose of the new treaty was summarized in a preamble as being covered by the following points: 1. The maintenance of the general interests of all Powers in China through a recognition of China's independence and China's integrity, as well as of the principle of equal possibilities for the commerce and industries of all nations; 2. The maintenance of the territorial rights of the treaty making Powers in eastern Asia and India and the right to defend their own special interests in these territories.

be mentioned that the war between Japan and Russia took place on Chinese, that is, neutral territory, without permission of the neutral Power, and although the Treaty of Portsmouth provided that the war zone must be vacated by both Powers within eighteen months, still both belligerents contrived by more or less questionable means to continue in possession of the greater part of these districts.

On August 15 last the Japanese representative in Berlin, acting upon instructions received from his Government, handed the Foreign Office a communication which, referring to the Anglo-Japanese treaty, demanded the recall of all German men-of-war then cruising in Japanese or Chinese waters, or the disarmament of these ships; it demanded also that Kiao-chow be handed over to the Japanese on or before August 23. Germany naturally sent the Japanese Ambassador his passports and recalled her own Ambassador in Tokyo. Nor was Germany greatly surprised by Japan's attitude. Rumors of various sorts had been about for some time, and the Japanese residing in Germany had been leaving the country with a speed which savored of flight.

England was responsible for this, of course, as was demonstrated by the Japanese Minister of the Exterior on September 4 in the Japanese Assembly, when he stated that England had asked Japan's assistance in August, saying that German men-of-war were threatening Anglo-Japanese commerce and that preparations for the war were being made in Kiao-chow. A declaration of war by the Emperor of Japan repeats this statement and alleges that Japan did all in her power to maintain peace.

Neither statement is correct. On the contrary, the Foreign Office in Berlin, before the receipt of the ultimatum, stated that the German squadron in eastern Asia had received instructions to commit no act of hostility in case Japan declared herself neutral, but no answer was received from Japan to this communication. That this would have been possible, there is no doubt. In the year 1870, at the suggestion of the commanders of the German and French squadrons in Eastern waters, the object of which was to declare these waters neutral. In Berlin the treaty was passed; London also approved it. Paris recommended it warmly.

But the fall of the empire was at hand and the National Government declared that, in view of the barbarous manner in which the Germans conducted warfare, it did not feel that it cared to forego any advantage accruing to the French naval superiority. The result of this superiority was the taking of one German merchantman which, by purchase, had become English.

Japan's action, therefore, must be considered simply as an attempt to capture a German colony at small cost, especially as the colony gives Japan a special foothold in China. That the scheme emanated from England does not make it more honorable, for there existed only the feeblest of pretexts for the casus federis of the Anglo-Japanese treaty.



High flying—The first attempt of the German aviators with two passengers turned out well.

A plan also seems afoot on the part of Japan to try and capture our colonies in the Pacific Ocean. To illustrate this, we quote from a statement made by Count Okuma, the present Prime Minister of Japan, in September, 1905, in discussing the Anglo-Japanese treaty of that year: "I welcome the new treaty cordially. The peace not alone of the East but of the entire world is secured by this treaty, which will be a mighty instrument in the cause of civilization and humanity. The benefits arising from it do not confine themselves to the treaty signing Powers, but include all nations. It is particularly delightful that non-Christian Japan has been admitted to the treaty on the same footing as the greatest of nations."

If we eliminate the word "non-Christian" from this statement we will find in it the key to Japan's attitude and part in the war. The illimitable concept of the entire Japanese nation and of the entire Japanese nation are Japan's reason for entering the war and taking part in it at the side of the "greatest of nations." Japan will reckon the cost of what she is doing later on.

On September 16 despatches from London, which stated that England had asked Japan to undertake the protection of the Indian Empire; Japan had in turn demanded free emigration into the English colonies in the Pacific, a hundred million dollars, and a loan of five hundred million dollars, all of which demands had been granted by England.

We do not wish to inquire into the correctness of this news. Of greater importance than the result of such proceeding for Japan are the consequences for England. Without exception the English colonies regard the immigration of Asiatics as a calamity, and even exclusion to the Hindus, although these are under British rule, and Canada recently passed a law directed against the Hindus only. There is no doubt, therefore, that the colonies will violently oppose any measure of the kind. And how will England, if she admits the Japanese, contrive to exclude the Hindus, who are fighting for her in Europe? How will she force her colonies to admit Asiatics?

Japanese troops are to be sent to India, naturally in the interest of the Government, for there are no foreign enemies there. How will the Hindus be when subjected to such an indignity? How will England get rid of the Japanese troops when she no longer requires or desires them?

Japan is to have a free hand in China! And all the Powers—the list is headed by England—who guaranteed China her integrity—what of them? And what will the United States, with interests in China and the Pacific, say to all this? Does England think she can with a proud gesture of the hand silence that country?

Worst of all, however, is the promised \$200,000,000. Japan kept quiet after her war with Russia solely because her finances were at low ebb. What she will do when she gets hold of such an enormous sum none can say.

All these problems seem to point to the fact that the Pekin despatch is not genuine, unless indeed it is the last throw of a desperate gambler who is ready to commit any abomination if he can thereby save himself. Private individuals of this type end in the gutter or in jail; for politicians who begin to play so shoddy a game only one fate can be requisitioned: "Finis Britannie!"

The Necessities of War.

By PROF. DR. HANS THOMA.

In the prehistoric ages of China—it was long before Confucius made his teachings known to man—the hearts of men still untamed and uncontrolled ruled over the primeval powers of the will, and the word was: Yea, yea, nay, nay.

In those rude days two selected champions met in mortal combat; it was understood that one of them must give up his life. They wielded mighty swords indeed and protected their bodies by great bucklers. The heroes were equally matched. But one of them was crafty; he bore a golden shield all set with precious stones, a magnificent work of art indeed, the like of which did not exist in all the world, and the people admired it greatly.

He calculated that he would protect himself with this shield, thinking that his enemy could not possibly venture to hew through this shining, world renowned shield, and thus behind his shield he would be safe while with his sword in his good right hand he could hack

and hew at the enemy's rude iron shield. But if the enemy dared to hew through the golden shield the onlookers would consider this a desecration and say: "Only a rude peasant could have the audacity to destroy this artistically worked shield."

So he had thought it all out. But the event was quite different, for the other champion thought: "My life is dearer to me than my enemy's golden shield, and the reproaches of the onlookers will not trouble me in the least." He went forth to battle and crushed the golden shield to bits, so that it was of no further use to its owner. Whether the latter was killed or not I could not ascertain from the ancient manuscript. It seems more probable that the doughty champion was satisfied with disarming his opponent, and perhaps he helped him to pick up the bits of his shield, for he had no enmity toward the shield. In many matters we cannot understand the Chinese at all.

The present war is hard and primitive, for it is concerned with the very life of Germany, the life of a nation, compared with this the destruction of a work of art is of little weight. If it has to be made a sacrifice to the necessities of war. Even we Germans weep for the destruction of a work of art and protect it as far as we can, and we also cherish the hope that a sound, consecrated people can always produce new works of art which will express their own individuality.

To-day it is a matter of life or death, of the firm foundation of our nation. In the presence of this hard fact all art loving tenderness must give way. In the future this love will express itself all the more vigorously.

How, then, can such a clamor be made about the destruction of some works of art when this war is destroying hundreds of thousands of developed life works with gruesome impartiality?

How, then, can such a clamor be made about the destruction of some works of art when this war is destroying hundreds of thousands of developed life works with gruesome impartiality?

Blames Russian Ambassador to France for the War

Individual Responsibility Rests Wholly on Isvolsky, One Time Foreign Minister, Says Dr. Fischerauer, Austrian Vice-Consul in New York.

By DR. FRIEDRICH FISCHERAUER,
Austrian Vice-Consul in New York.

A TERRIBLE and exceptionally sanguinary war devastates the old world. Europe is not alone the arena of the mighty struggle, for Asiatic peoples have also been drawn into it by England and have brought warfare according to their own fashion into sorely tried Europe bleeding from a thousand wounds, and are thus infinitely enhancing the atrocities of the war.

It is no longer a secret for any one and is not denied by careful observers that Russia is responsible in the first place, if not exclusively, for the awful carnage. The responsibility for the destruction of so many young lives, the pride and hope of all nations, and for the devastation of the nations' wealth accumulated after many years of hard labor rests upon those Russian statesmen who with a singular talent for intrigue have caused the present conflict in Europe. One of them only recently with head erect proclaimed to the world "This is my war," and thus perhaps unwittingly refuted the attempt made at Petrograd to ascribe this greatest of all wars to the provocation of the two central European Powers.

These Powers had nothing to gain by war. Time was working for them. Austria-Hungary with an administration gradually becoming more and more responsive to the national desires of her various races, was gradually removing the roots of Russian intrigue at Belgrade, and as for Germany, the indefatigable industry of her manufacturers and merchants, which has become proverbial, would, if peace had prevailed over her English competitor. The development of the German navy would also have made such progress in that event that a conflict on the seas with the English fleet would hardly have been contemplated with terror.

However, as stated before, it was a Russian statesman who dispelled all doubt as to who brought about and decided this war, he having proudly and with some presumption described the greatest European war as his own. This statesman is Isvolsky, Ambassador to France. The history of his country in the last few years is closely identified with his name, and this fact enhances the weight of his declaration. It throws a bright light upon the situation and also serve as a welcome guide in the perplexing maze of European politics to those who live far from the old world and who are therefore unable to follow Isvolsky's activities in all their details.

The fact that during his incumbency of the office of Minister of Foreign Affairs he did not exactly acquit himself with glory and moreover succumbed in his diplomatic encounter with Count Aehrenthal during the crisis of the Bosnian annexation surely does not affect the importance of Isvolsky's rejoinders uttered with so much emphasis over the result of his many years' efforts at last attained.

However, I should not like to dwell any longer upon this question and will limit myself to the statement that both Austria-Hungary and Germany will, thanks to his frankness, forever remember Isvolsky, notwithstanding the evil experiences had with him. For has he not achieved with the simplicity of a child what the brains of the wise could not accomplish in the German White Book? He has nailed down the fact beyond all doubt that the war was desired and provoked by Russia.

In order to be able to judge correctly the European situation it is necessary to make some digression. One must go back to the time when upon the occasion of the crowning of King Edward VII. of England the politics of the insular empire were turned in a new direction. The royal politician considered it in the interest of his country, partly on personal and partly on sufficiently well known political and economic grounds, to modify the friendly attitude toward the Triple Alliance and more and more to approach the Double Entente.

An understanding entered into with France was followed by one with Russia. The number of political interviews of the crowned Germanophobe increased in an uncomfortable manner in the attempt to make Spain join the western Powers. Italy was ensnared and Austria-Hungary was showered with tokens of love and friendship.

Each year Edward appeared in the imperial summer resort at Ischl in order to assure the death of European wars in fervent words of his unflinching friendship. The sympathies for the English were great in those days in the dual monarchy and the value of the political friendship with the United Kingdom was also highly appreciated in leading circles. This friendship, of course, had its natural limitations. It was naturally never meant to serve as a basis for the attempt to isolate Germany.

Yet those at the helm of England's foreign policy regarded it in this sense. And when they learned of the understanding between Austria-Hungary and the insular empire would naturally have to end where it was directed against Germany, the formerly so warm English sentiments for Vienna suddenly became cold. This was in the year 1907. In the summer of this year King Edward left the imperial residence at Ischl filled with anger.

Soon we were made to feel London's disaffection in a remarkable manner. First it was shown in the least intervention of the great Powers in Macedonia, in which England suddenly arrayed herself on the side of Russia and fully supported the most extravagant claims of the Czar, which were wholly unacceptable to the Turks. But the anger of the English over the good faith of Austria-Hungary to her ally broke out with a most elemental force when in January, 1908, Count Aehrenthal obtained from the Turks the concession for the construction of the Sanjak railway.

The attacks of the English press vied in their violence and rudeness with those of their Pan-Slavic colleagues at Petrograd and Moscow, to say nothing of the French press, which like French diplomacy had for years been accustomed to obey blindly all orders coming from St. Petersburg and to follow every sign from the Russian ally even as a subaltern.

The convention of Murz-Steg, or more correctly the programme there agreed upon between Austria-Hungary and Russia in 1903 for the reform of European Turkey, was only a temporary deviation from the general purpose of the Russian policy influenced by Pan-Slavic tendencies, whose ultimate aim was to impress the Balkan peoples into the service of her efforts for territorial expansion; that is, to use them as a battering ram against Austria-Hungary, whose existence in her present strength constituted an obstruction to Russian plans of expansion toward Constantinople.

Murz-Steg therefore constituted only a pause in the furtherance of Russian territorial lusts. Besides, it was intended to cover the rear of the Czar's empire during the then impending accounting with Japan and to protect it from surprises in the Balkans at a time when it was about to engage all its forces against the yellow race in the Far East. And this aim was actually accomplished by it. Austria-Hungary, which has ever labored for the free development of the Balkan peoples, conscientiously fulfilled the obligations assumed by her at Murz-Steg and maintained such a correct attitude that it was possible for Russia during her war with Japan to leave her western frontier unprotected.


It is certainly not Austria-Hungary's fault that Russia did not succeed in winning glory for her arms in that war. The reason therefore must be sought in conditions which are pretty generally known and whose discussion would lead us far beyond the limitations of the subject at hand. Let it therefore be asserted here only that when Russia after her defeats in Manchuria and the total annihilation of the Russian fleet off Tsushima secured peace with Japan for some time to come, Isvolsky, the Foreign Minister, grasped the first opportunity which offered itself to declare the Murz-Steg understanding null and void and to free himself of the fetters assumed only with the pressure of the Japanese danger and to obtain an absolutely free hand in the Balkans.

The occasion for this was the aforementioned Austrian concession obtained from Turkey for the construction of the Sanjak railway, which with fair splitting arguments was declared a violation of the status quo.

Isvolsky had thus obtained a free hand and thereby advanced a step nearer his fervent aim of combating the dual monarchy. His predecessor's policy of friendly rapprochement with Austria-Hungary was thrown to the winds and Russia now under the influence of this dangerous man proceeded upon the path which as its ultimate aim was bound to lead to the present horrible war. The disastrous defeat in Manchuria and the Russian pride thereby wounded to the quick incited the moribund vainglorious Minister to obtain in Europe the military laurels which had been denied the Czar's empire in the Far East.



Churchill (after the loss of the three cruisers): "The Germans seem to misunderstand my statement that we have three for every one of theirs."



Aboukir, Hogue, Cressy.